Religious Beliefs That Influence Family Size and Birth Control

Introduction

Recently, we witnessed a surge in psychological research examining the role of religion in man life (e.g., Ysseldyk et al., 2010; Coyle and Lyons, 2011; Brambilla et al., 2016). This rise in involvement can probably be explained past recent concerns in the Western earth nearly the social and political implications of the surge of "bad religion" (Basedau et al., 2016). Equally a result, in that location has been an intense debate concerning the social adventure vs. value of religion and its role inside the state (Coyle and Lyons, 2011). Yet, we would argue that the notions of "adept" vs. "bad" religions, or even unidimensional and dichotomous categorizations of religiosity as moderate vs. farthermost, do not do justice to the issues and lead to simplistic understandings whereby religious extremism is often but seen as a root crusade of violence and terrorism.

Such notions and categorizations matter: religious group members are extremely various, whereby religion (or even religious extremism) is expressed in very different ways. Problematic likewise is that such simplistic representations are consequential in that they make up one's mind the perception of extremist groups. For example, following 9/11, almost 70% of the U.S. security policies targeted Arabs and Muslims as they were seen to be associated with the adherents of extremist movement (Cainkar, 2009). It appears then that the term religious extremism engenders negative stereotypes toward particular groups of religious people among the public and policy-makers. This occurs despite frequent warnings that popular (or journalistic) uses of the term "extremism," associating information technology with terrorism, might lead to misunderstandings of particular groups (Schipper, 2003).

To counter such simplistic understandings of religious extremism, we present a multidimensional model of religious extremism that aims to advance our knowledge of religion as a complex and diverse social identity (Ysseldyk et al., 2010). In particular, nosotros challenge the idea that religious extremism manifests merely in i particular way and suggest that one dimension of religious extremism (east.thousand., a radical agenda in politics) may not necessarily be accompanied by extremism in another dimension (e.g., intolerance for diverseness in rituals). To sympathize people's willingness to support violent political activity, nosotros therefore need to explore religious extremism on multiple dimensions and be open up to the idea that not every form of religious extremism is associated with a willingness to achieve goals in violent means.

In this paper, we briefly review the different interpretations and understandings of extremism within religion and advise an alternative model that allows for a more accurate and complete understanding of various dimensions of faith. Nosotros contend that our analysis will help to explicate why, despite the perceived similarities that lead outsiders to cluster them together, extreme movements are often in conflict with 1 another over what it means to be a good religious person. To illustrate the multidimensional nature of religious extremism, we focus on one particular context: Indonesian Muslims. We propose that in other faith contexts, the dimensions proposed may need to exist expanded or adjusted to be more accurate and useful.

Moderate vs. Extreme Religiosity

In psychological research, a variety of terms have been used to describe an appointment with religion, such as religiosity (due east.one thousand., Gibbs and Crader, 1970; Diener and Clifton, 2002; Paloutzian, 2017), religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; Williamson, 2010; Liht et al., 2011), radicalism, or extremism (e.g., Simon et al., 2013; Webber et al., 2017; Kruglanski et al., 2018). These terms are sometimes used interchangeably, and sometimes contested (e.g., religious fundamentalism may be used by some scholars to refer to a rigid interpretation of scriptures, in dissimilarity to religious extremism which is frequently associated with a detail political agenda). Moreover, while religiosity has been linked to positive outcomes such as college well-being (e.g., Carlucci et al., 2015) and life satisfaction (e.m., Bergan and McConatha, 2001), religious fundamentalism and extremism accept been linked to more negative outcomes such as prejudice (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992), hostility (Koopmans, 2015), or even armed disharmonize (Cornell, 2005).

One prominent definition of extremism as a motivation for terrorism is that extremism comprises ideological behavior about an obligation to bring dorsum the political arrangement to a class suggested past religious norms through violence (Arena and Arrigo, 2005). Therefore, the characterization of extremist is attributed to groups fighting for their political agendas against mainstream systems accepted by the bulk of people (e.g., ISIS confronting the government of Syria, or MILF or Moro Islamic Liberation Front confronting the authorities of the Philippines). Such a definition of extremism associated with political violence is related to broad collective responses against perceived oppression or injustice, and it may be fueled by extreme religious dogma or non.

The understanding of religious extremism as political has been elaborated by many scholars. For instance, religious extremists have been characterized by Sageman (2008) equally seeking martyrdom, and fueled past acrimony regarding perceived injustice. Similarly, Wiktorowicz (2005) proposed a four-stage model of extremism culminating in violence: first, a cognitive openness to new people or new ideas followed by the experiences of personal or group grievance (e.k., discrimination and oppression). Second, the individual takes up activism, and the openness can lead to an acceptance of the group'southward farthermost norms (e.g., for violence). Belief in the grouping'due south claims and willingness to act based on the group'south norms can overcome the actor'south rational choice perspectives. Thus, when the group'southward norm allows the use of non-normative tactics such as violence to gain their objectives, the individuals will intentionally commit violence on behalf of the grouping.

A similar model of religious extremism equally the culmination of a trajectory of religious identity into grouping-based violence is put forward by Silber and Bhatt (2007). The process of being extreme begins with an openness to new thoughts (e.thousand., in religion) that leads into a procedure of worldview change. Within this process, a tragic experience can lead to the loss of meaning and connection with the initial identity (east.g., every bit a religious moderate). The adoption of extreme beliefs and norms fuelled past tragedy is enhanced past the indoctrination process operated by an extreme organisation. Again, religious extremism is seen to accomplish its ultimate end in the expression of violence past the thespian.

The above conceptual approaches to extremism associate extremism with violence committed equally a grouping member. Other more than individual-level analyses of extremism operationalize it as endorsement of particular beliefs, such equally the duty to engage in violent holy war against the enemy (Webber et al., 2017) or sympathy toward extremist groups and back up for their political action (Simon et al., 2013). Some analyses have spanned both individual and group levels: for instance, Schmid (2014) proposes that either for individuals (i.due east., personal beliefs) or groups (i.eastward., as embedded in salient group norms), the v alarm signs of religious extremism include belief in accented truth, endorsement of bullheaded obedience, a quest to establish utopia, belief that the end justifies the ways, and a declaration of holy war. Similarly, Hogg and Adelman (2013) have divers extremism through the aspects covering group level (i.e., a radical agenda, back up for violent activity, and authoritarian leadership) and individual level (i.e., extreme pro-group action).

While nosotros applaud the development of more nuanced ways to understand religious extremism, and the diversity of definitions higher up, we propose that such distinctions do not go far plenty in unpacking the multiple ways in which extremism can exist expressed. To permit for the development of this diverseness, we adopt a broader definition of extremism and define extremism as the extent to which there are clear norms about appropriate beliefs and very little latitude in accepting different pattern of norms or item behaviors. Thus, the focus is not then much on the behavior itself, but on the extent to which item behaviors are normatively prescribed inside a religious group with little room for deviating from that. Therefore, what is perceived as farthermost in one historical or cultural context may be moderate or mainstream in another. This usage is in contrast to the definitions proposed by scholars who accept associated extremism exclusively with violent intergroup conflict.

In line with Sedgwick (2010), nosotros advise that religion, either at individual or group level, tin can be expressed forth a continuum ranging from moderate to extreme, only get farther by arguing that there is not one continuum, but multiple dimensions of religion. Nosotros discuss the implication of embracing extremism in 1 dimension just not in others, and argue that the specific constellations of moderate vs. radical features are important when considering how faith is expressed. To illustrate the multiple dimensions of religious extremism, we focus on the context of Indonesian Muslim groups. Nosotros propose that our assay should besides assist to understand religious extremism in other organized religion groups just that the dimensions on which moderate vs. extreme religiosity may be expressed may vary.

The Multidimensionality of Organized religion as a Framework to Understanding Extremism

We are certainly not the first to advise that at that place are multiple dimensions to organized religion and that these dimensions uniquely connect to important behaviors, such equally life satisfaction, stress, youth deviancy. Glock and Stark (1965) suggested that within all religions, there are five singled-out components: ideological (beliefs), intellectual (knowledge), ritual (overt religious behavior), experiential (feelings or emotions), and consequential (the issue of religiosity in the world). More recently, Saroglou (2011) proposed 4 basic dimensions of faith and individual religiosity that are partially distinct: believing (i.eastward., representing the cerebral part of religion), bonding (i.e., experiences that bail individuals with perceived transcendent reality, others, and the inner-self), behaving (i.e., specific norms and moral arguments defining right and wrong), and belonging (i.e., identification with detail tradition, denomination, or a specific religious grouping). According to these models, and others, the behavioral expression of religion is complex and multi-faceted.

We depict on these frameworks to examine religious extremism. Combining insights from these prior models, we advise a multidimensional construction to faith that can help to sympathize the means in which moderate vs. extreme religion can be expressed. We elaborate our four-dimensional model beneath, but to summarize: our starting point is the literature on violent religious extremism, where the nearly common dimension identified (and ofttimes the simply dimension considered) is the political dimension. In addition, we were inspired past various religious movements in Indonesia that take different emphasis on their narratives and actions. For example, a group named Wahdah Islamiyah has a potent campaign to purify Muslims' theological beliefs and the way religious rituals are conducted, seeking to return to an ideal standard of the past. Notwithstanding, they tend to accept the current political organization employed to rule the nation. In contrast, Hizbut Tahrir, a banned system in Indonesia, proposes that Muslims are responsible to recreate an Islamic empire, by rejecting autonomous systems and nation-states; however, Hizbut Tahrir does not typically engage in theological debates. Therefore, alongside the political dimension, we as well consider three other dimensions which emerge in seeking to empathise religious extremism in Indonesia. A second theological dimension of extremism that is relevant in the Indonesian context is adapted from Saroglou's (2011) believing dimension: nosotros suggest that religions share theological beliefs, and these behavior might be extreme or moderate. In the Indonesian context, a third, ritual, dimension is inspired by Saroglou's (2011) bonding dimension indicating that organized religion bonds its members through ritual practices. Some groups have very piffling breadth in how they understand and practice their religious rituals and justify the other practices as forbidden innovation. Finally, we advise a social dimension that captures the intra- and intergroup relations of the religious group in Indonesia. Intra-group processes include the specific group norms that control the members' moral compass and relations to each other. Intergroup processes include the categorization of in-groups and out-groups every bit reflected in Saroglou's dimension of belonging, but as well the specific group norms controlling relations to members of other faiths.

Before elaborating these dimensions, it is important to note that the four focal dimensions in the present paper practise not imply that other dimensions do not be when explaining religious extremism. We advise that the present dimensions are important in understanding religious groups' perspective in the contemporary Indonesian context. Yet, these four dimensions may become more or less important every bit a result of item historical and cultural developments or group comparisons, and this may also hateful that other dimensions may need to exist considered for other religious groups, and when studying other contexts (see also, Zarkasyi, 2008; Ysseldyk et al., 2010). Below we consider the four dimensions in plow, and identify how the dimensions might be used in research.

Moderate vs. Farthermost Organized religion: A Multidimensional Approach Based on Religious Movements in Indonesia

We address religious extremism and the multiple dimensions of religion in Effigy 1. Using a classical standpoint that organized religion is expressed through multiple dimensions (Glock and Stark, 1965; Saroglou, 2011), we propose to examine a multidimensional religious extremism through separate political, theological, ritual, and social dimensions which may or may not co-vary.

Figure i. Illustration of the farthermost-moderate continuum across a multidimensional representation of religion. The figure illustrates a religious group with high extremism in theological and ritual dimensions merely moderate behavior in the social and political dimensions.

We argue that this exercise enables a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of religious extremism as presented in Table ane. In what follows, we depict attending to the interplay of these different dimensions for different religious groups. Nosotros argue that the four dimensions of religious extremism (i.eastward., political, theological, ritual, and social) provide a useful framework to locate religious groups, which allows for a better agreement of the way in which their organized religion is expressed and, importantly, the manner in which they aim to achieve religious goals past peaceful or less peaceful ways. Following our outline of the four dimensions, we discuss a methodology for measuring context-specific religious extremism and discuss research applications.

Table i. Mapping out the moderate and extreme end points of the 4 dimensions of religion.

From Moderate to Extreme: The Political Dimension

The manner that organized religion and politics should relate has been a source of intense debate and struggle throughout history (Armstrong, 2000). In the psychological literature, the political dimension of religion has not received much attention (e.grand., Diener and Clifton, 2002; Saroglou, 2010) unless it is in the context of "bad" religion (Basedau et al., 2016). Nevertheless, as noted to a higher place, political beliefs and actions take been the principal focus of "religious extremism" as defined by scholars (east.g., Webber et al., 2017). In this approach, farthermost religious movements seek political power, to promote the adoption of their religious norms through laws or force.

Contemporary religious extremism in the political dimension for Islam is often associated with support for the Caliphate or Muslim empire, which persisted in diverse forms from the 700 s to 1924 AD, when the terminal Ottoman Caliphate was abolished in Turkey. During this time, Islam was associated with both a hierarchical, sometimes expansionist, imperial state and a specific system of religious, legal, and cultural practices called sharia law. More extreme groups advocate a radical agenda in political change (e.one thousand., a resurrection of an Islamic empire, a borderless state encompassing all Muslim nations, Ward, 2009; Osman, 2010a). They believe that political norms should be practical to alter the current locally adapted political systems beyond many Muslim countries. Other, more moderate groups, however, strive for an integration of religious values inside the electric current political systems (e.g., democracy, national country, etc.). They tend to believe that faith should non be politically represented through the legalization of its social order.

The political dimension is typically the most salient dimension for scholars when discussing Islamic religious extremism, as information technology is for other groups. More than extreme stances on this political dimension such as support for comprehensive sharia, support for the resurrection of the Caliphate, and the rejection of commonwealth were used by Fealy (2004) to place extremist groups in Indonesia (due east.g., Darul Islam, Indonesian Mujahedeen Forum, Jihad troops, and Hizbut Tahrir). In improver, the extent to which religious groups corroborate of and participate in current political systems in Republic of indonesia has been used to identify the more than moderate Islamic movements in Indonesia (e.thousand., Muhammadiyah, Nahdhatul Ulama, etc.).

It should exist noted, nevertheless, that religious extremism on the political dimension can manifest in dissimilar ways, and that politically extremist groups propose dissimilar paths to reconcile the constitution with religious norms. For instance, some religious groups propose to promote sharia laws through democratic governance, other groups reject the current political arrangement by actively campaigning for the imposition of sharia without violence; and finally, however other groups are willing to utilize violence to destabilize the authorities (See Ward, 2009; Webber et al., 2017). With or without support for violent means of creating change, the advancement toward comprehensive sharia constabulary every bit well every bit the revival of an Islamic empire reflects a radical agenda to transform the current established political organisation.

In addition to these different views regarding the place of faith in the land, groups of Muslim also differ in their support for democracy (e.g., Halla et al., 2013). Some of them reject democracy, believing that democracy as a political organisation is incompatible with Islam (Fealy, 2004; Ward, 2009), that Islamic instructions about all matters relating to life are clearly articulated in the Quran and Hadith (the words, behaviors, and approvals of the prophet). This view holds that the musyawara (political discussions to reach a consensus) should only be used for decisions almost particular technical matters, not core principles of social functioning (Nurhayati, 2014). In contrast, another groups of Muslim do not favor or sanction a particular political system, merely rather abet for principles of tolerance and respect in the governance of all political systems. In this way, the latter groups perceive commonwealth as one style to manage national affairs that is not in disharmonize with Islam (Ward, 2009; Nurhayati, 2014).

From Moderate to Farthermost: The Theological Dimension

Theological beliefs ascertain religion for lay people (Saroglou, 2011), and researchers such every bit Stark and Glock (1968) take highlighted the importance of conceptual representations of God in understanding people's engagement with their organized religion (see too, Granqvist et al., 2010). Unlike conceptualizations of God provide a meaningful snapshot of a laic'due south religious worldview. How so exercise more moderate vs. more extreme forms of religion take shape? We suggest that for religious groups that are located at the moderate end of the theological dimension, behavior of an impersonal cosmic forcefulness distanced from worldly affairs (deism) boss. Moderate views of God as a personal agent (theism; Bader and Palmer, 2011) present a existence fostering love and non hostility, whereby the paradigm of God is characterized past gracious images (due east.one thousand., The Merciful, The Benevolent, etc.) assuasive different religious interpretations and expanding the credence toward unlike patterns of norms. In dissimilarity, groups that are located at the extreme end of the theological continuum typically view God every bit a personal agent and embrace names for God that comprise an authoritarian image (e.g., The Compeller, The Conqueror, etc.) leading into rigid interpretations and coercion to suppress different narratives.

In that location is evidence that these images of God are consequential. For case, normative beliefs associated with an authoritarian image of God predict more than support for death sentence (Bader and Palmer, 2011). In addition, an disciplinarian conception (e.chiliad., God as the One who strikes downward in anger) has been establish to be associated with a disposition to retrieve, feel, and act more than punitively toward people considered to be "evil." In contrast, people who characterize God in a more than nurturing way (due east.g., God is love) react in a more prosocial way toward others (Granqvist et al., 2010). Historically, an authoritarian image of God was frequently associated with apocalyptic narratives to attract people to convert into their group and to strength people to leave their "immoral" norms (Bossy, 2001).

Edifice on this approach, we propose that variation on the theological dimension of extremism is associated with dissimilar behaviors to reach group goals and to prove loyalty to the religious group. Moderate positions on the theological dimension are indicated by the prominence of gracious images of God and an appreciation of differences in theological beliefs. Conversely, those groups located at the extreme stop of the theological continuum, embracing an authoritarian epitome of God, are more likely to strike at perceived contrary theological behavior. For case, we propose that those who believe in an authoritarian, persecuting God will be more likely to believe that natural disasters occur more frequently to groups who alive in ways that God disapproves of. Furthermore, Muslims who endorse an disciplinarian conception of God volition tend to define the meaning of "jihad" as the duty to appoint in a holy state of war, whereas those located at the more than moderate end of the continuum will take a more flexible interpretation of the discussion "jihad" every bit beliefs aimed at creating positive change (Esposito, 2002). A similar distinction can be witnessed in Christianity: interpretations of the religious duty to build the "Kingdom of God" volition be interpreted by moderates as a spiritual exercise to transform society toward beingness more loving, caring, and inclusive, whereas for those Christian groups located at the extreme end of the theological continuum, this duty is seen every bit a need to build a concrete empire established through crusading military ventures (Whitlark, 2011).

From Moderate to Extreme: The Ritual Dimension

Specific rituals allow for the expression of worship or shared feelings with others (Whitehouse and Lanman, 2014), helping to metaphrase notions of religion as a lived experience. Many religious people believe that their religious rituals are guided directly by God. For instance, most Muslims believe that God directs their principal rituals including their prayers v times per day. However, once faith has spread to a wider community, different patterns of rituals may emerge from either local customs or from the integration of religious rituals with local traditions. This accommodation of new practices can often polarize religious adherents into groups who are either open up to new influences, or who decline compromises and run into them equally forbidden innovations. For example, some Mandinga immigrants in Portugal view a "writing-on-the-hand" ritual as essential for conferring both Muslim and ethnic identities (Johnson, 2006). In the ritual, children are initiated into Quranic study (and machismo) by having a verse written on their hands, which they and then ceremoniously lick off, ingesting the poetry. The ritual is contentious to those who experience that this Mandinga "custom" should be abased to keep Islam pure (Johnson, 2006).

We propose that intolerance of diversity in ritual practices distinguishes moderates from extreme religious groups on this dimension. Moderate religion on the ritual dimension is indicated by tolerant views about the influence of local traditions on the way rituals are performed. Moderate groups tin have the influence of tradition inside ritual every bit information technology is not a compulsory ritual and non straight taught by God. Conversely, those groups located at the farthermost end of the theological continuum are more probable to strive to keep religious rituals pure. This often goes together with vigilance to protect the integrity of rituals, but also with intergroup tension whereby extreme groups charge more moderate groups of beingness sinful in their practice. For case, the Salafi movement in Indonesia is the strongest grouping to strive for purity in rituals opposing more relaxed Muslim religious traditions such equally allowing worship in the ancestors' graveyard and the commemoration of the Prophet'south birthday. To some extent, the Salafi motion labels the young man Muslims who perform those rituals as idolatrous (Musyrik) or even infidels (Kafir). The labels, of course, are psychologically painful for the labeled groups of Muslims. Within the Christian tradition, the Puritan move is one historical example of ritual extremism, rejecting other Christian denominations as insufficiently pure and compromised past lax tolerance of cultural practices.

From Moderate to Extreme: The Social Dimension

The social dimension is concerned with intergroup relations with other groups (religious and otherwise) besides as intragroup processes, reflected in norms regarding how to interact with others. Extremists on the social dimension typically take a hostile view of other faiths. In their view, out-groups use sinister conspirators as pawns to influence their religious grouping members (Fealy, 2004; Kohut et al., 2006). As a result, blaming others (e.thousand., foreigners) for in-group disadvantage is a common narrative to heighten support from the public for their agenda. In contrast, more moderate members of a religion frequently attribute the root causes of in-group problems to internal factors such as anti-intellectual biases, geopolitical instability, and corruption (Lackey, 2013). The moderate groups tend to be more open to complexity in analyzing the causes of the in-group's problems. Moderate groups also place greater emphasis on the need to change to accost modern concerns.

Consequently, more moderate groups tend to be more open to collaboration in inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue whereas more extreme religious groups emphasize rejection and avoidance. Interfaith dialogue is often developed by more than moderate religious activists to strengthen inter-religious cooperation as a way to solve common problems (e.g., environmental problems, a cohesive national identity, economical problems, and law enforcement). However, more farthermost religious groups often actively refuse this collaborative effort, as they perceive inter-religious dialogue as part of a conspiracy to weaken the organized religion in their religion.

Turning to intragroup relations with other members of the faith community: religion serves every bit an organizing set of key values that are captured and expressed in group norms. In the context of social relationships, such group norms may vary in the extent to which they tolerate difference and dissent within the religious group. At times, harsh attitudes toward dissenters and deviants may prevail when universal values of tolerance and group-specific values clash and individuals are forced to follow group-specific values. For instance, considering Islam forbids liquors, some Muslims would similar to force the government to ban the trade in alcohol, without considering that other groups of people take dissimilar norms permitting alcohol consumption (Osman, 2010a). In the context of Indonesia, an agile group called the Islamic Defenders Forepart (FPI) is one of many aiming to force the entire nation to follow one version of Islamic social norms (Arifianto, 2017). Hence, the social dimension of religious extremism in our approach is indicated in Indonesia past patterns of externally attributing the causes of in-group disadvantages, and forcing out-groups equally well equally all in-group members to follow narrow, prescriptive social norms. Naturally, social and political dimensions of religion volition oftentimes exist inter-related, peculiarly where groups seek political power to impose their socially extreme viewpoint. Notwithstanding, in distinguishing the ii dimensions, we highlight that some groups will be socially extreme without endorsing farthermost political views or seeking political power. Groups who expel internal heretics and who shun contact with infidels without trying to dominate them may fall into this category, in our model.

The Interaction Among Multiple Dimensions of Religious Extremism in Indonesia

Equally mentioned, the discourse of religious extremism has mostly been related to the political context (Fealy, 2004; Zarkasyi, 2008). To illustrate the importance of not merely exploring the political dimension when agreement religious extremism, we took a closer look at some "extremist" Islamic movements in Indonesia (i.e., that score loftier in extremism on the political dimension). In an attempt to understand different forms of extremism more than comprehensively, we compared these groups on the other three dimensions. Before outlining our findings, information technology is important to note that the classification of a particular group as politically extreme was based on specific historical events and developments: past acts of political rebellion by Darul Islam (Domain of Islam) and Negara Islam Republic of indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Land) in 1949. This was also the basis for selecting as extreme the current political motility Hizbut Tahrir and Islamic defender front end (FPI) who have gained support after the reform of 1998 (Fealy, 2004; Muhtadi, 2009; Osman, 2010a).

There are of import similarities between Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Majelis Mujahidin Republic of indonesia (MMI), and Hizbut Tahrir (HT) across all four dimensions of religious extremism. All groups score high in extremism on the political dimensions in that they demand a comprehensive legalization of sharia, a fully Islamic state, recreation of Caliphate, and the abolitionism of republic in Indonesia. Nonetheless, these groups differ from other politically "extreme" groups in Republic of indonesia. For example, the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) supports a comprehensive legalization of sharia, merely endorses democracy and rejects the revival of the Islamic state and Caliphate (Fealy, 2004). Some other group (Laskar Jihad or Jihad Troops) demands comprehensive sharia and rejects democracy, but besides rejects the revival of the Islamic state and Caliphate. Both these commonalities and differences have consequences for their relationship with other religious groups and the way they aim to achieve their goals. While we acknowledge the importance of unpacking the political dimension into constituent elements in some cases, our argument is that to fully understand these groups, we also demand to explore where these groups stand on the other 3 dimensions of religious extremism (i.e., theological, ritual, and social dimensions).

In terms of extremism in the theological dimension, notions about an angry God who uses natural disasters punitively are especially of import to tease the different extremist groups autonomously. For instance, some Muslim groups in Indonesia claim that ritual celebration of the local tradition in Palu in Cardinal Sulawesi is a main crusade of the convulsion and tsunami that hit the Indonesian coast in 2018, killing more than 2000 people. Likewise, such attributions also dominated when explaining the 2018 earthquake in Lombok Island (Habdan and Baits, 2018). These groups emphasized that the convulsion is a punishment from God to show disapproval of the politically different attitudes that are promoted by the political leader of the Isle (Hasan, 2018). Interestingly, such theological beliefs exercise not lead to a push for alter of the political system, simply merely to an invitation to render to Islamic norms as they understand them. This shows that an extreme theological belief may non be correlated with extremism on the political dimension.

However, extremism in the theological dimension may as well be related to a narrow interpretation of jihad as a core principle in Islam. Most Muslim groups believe that jihad means whatever zealous try to bring about a better world (Esposito, 2002). However, some groups restrict its interpretation to waging holy state of war, such equally Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Salafi Jihadi groups, and Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (Haron and Hussin, 2013). Theological behavior restricting the meaning of jihad to waging holy war accept an impact on political extremism, in that these can bulldoze believers into intentions to verbally or physically assault the hated out-groups to engage in jihad.

Finally, some groups that are located at the extreme stop of the ritual dimension are actively candidature to purify religious rituals and to suppress local traditions that are perceived equally diffusive from Islam. For example, some groups such equally the Salafi move and al Wahdah al Islamiyah in Indonesia campaign confronting local traditions and push for the Muslims to relinquish traditions that are perceived as not taught by the prophet (Salman, 2017). Importantly though, these movements practice not utilize physical violence in their efforts, and they accept and participate in the political system in Indonesia. Thus, although these groups tend to exist extreme on the ritual dimension, they are more moderate on other dimensions. For example, they accept a broader formulation of jihad (i.due east., a struggle for positive change), and they practice non preclude their members from participating in the current political organisation.

We take argued that extremism on the social dimension is represented past the trend to arraign others for the group's disadvantage and to force compliance to specific in-grouping's norms. We suggest that the tendency to forcefully need adherence to a narrow version of the in-grouping's norms typically results from feeling threatened by out-groups' norms. For instance, the Muslim Forum of Bogor (FMB) released a public statement calling on the city mayor to ban the commemoration of Cap Go Meh by Chinese people in the city. Fifty-fifty though such social extremism oftentimes involves intolerance of norm violations, social extremism is not always followed past extremism on other dimensions (e.g., ritual dimension). In detail, social extremism in Indonesia is rarely linked to terror campaigns.

The Consequences of Similarity in Extremism on Multiple Dimensions for Intergroup Relations

The dissimilar ways in which religious groups express their religious identity on the theological, ritual, social, and political dimensions bear upon not only the means they aim to achieve their goals merely also the means they chronicle to other religious groups. Using social identity theory as a lens to conceptualize intergroup relations (Turner and Oakes, 1986), we propose that the nature of intergroup relations betwixt moderate and extreme religious groups is determined by the perceived degree of similarity on the four dimensions. Every bit an illustration, 2 groups or more can cooperate with each other in their collective action when they perceive shared values and a larger identity, while breaking into disharmonize when internal differences are salient. For case, in Indonesia, when the former governor of Jakarta (Basuki Tjahaya Purnama aka Ahok) was eventually indicted on charges of insulting a section of the Quran, many Muslim groups were united in their efforts to demand punishment of him. A series of mass protests against the perceived blasphemy were attended by hundreds of thousands of people across the country (Fealy, 2016). From an identity perspective, it can be argued that the shared outrage about the former governor who was perceived to have insulted Islam brought dissimilar Muslim groups together, and different groups worked together to accost the common grievances and the common threats to the superordinate Muslim identity.

Despite this example of unity, it is also clear that in that location are many instances when relationships between moderate as well as more extreme religious groups are more tense. We fence that these tensions can besides be better understood by taking business relationship of the way in which moderate vs. more extreme expressions of identity take shape on the four identified dimensions. For example, members of The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and members of Hizbut Tahrir largely take the same stance on the social dimension in that both groups want to generate a new Islamic social order via the legalization of sharia in Indonesia. However, The Prosperous Justice Political party (PKS) oftentimes criticizes the members of Hizbut Tahrir because they disagree with the best "Islamic" method to reach their shared goal. Their disagreement emerges on the political dimension because PKS supports the democratic arrangement, as indicated past their participation in the general election, while Hizbut Tahrir absolutely rejects the democratic system and avoids autonomous politics every bit a way to enhance political power.

The possibility of compromise between two politically extreme movements depends on the level of identity (i.e., subgroup or subordinate identity) that is activated. When they confront common enemies (eastward.g., a group of Muslims or politicians who strongly support Indonesian diversity and oppose the legalization of Islamic law), the salience of their superordinate identity (i.e., as Muslim groups advocating the legalization of Islamic law in Republic of indonesia) may increase, and they may compromise or even integrate. However, open disharmonize is also likely, even if the groups are similarly extreme on one dimension, when differences on another dimension are salient.

A similar pattern may exist observed amidst groups of Muslims who are identified every bit farthermost in ritual dimensions. The Salafy movement and other groups (e.g., Mathla'ul Anwar, Wahdah al Islamiyah, etc.) may unite to produce narratives for ritual purification, and to accuse Muslims who exercise local traditions and their supporters of religious fault. That is, when they face moderate Muslims (eastward.g., Nahdhatul Ulama, a group which supports the preservation of local traditions and diversity), they volition activate a shared superordinate identity and work together. Withal, those ritually extreme groups tin conflict with each other when political differences are salient. For instance, many Salafy group members perceive that public protest is an illegitimate activity according to Islam, while other groups who share their farthermost identity on ritual dimension perceive it as legitimate tactic. The differences along the political dimension tin can pb them into efforts to dominate each other, and open contests for power.

The consequence of similarity and difference in the dimensions of religious extremism is relevant previous work on identity and conflict (Haslam et al., 1999). In this model, the salience of subgroup identity (e.g., as an activist of PKS or Hizbut Tahrir) can lead to a tendency to seek in-group favoritism, which in turn enhances their sense of self. However, when superordinate identity is salient (e.g., every bit Muslims who support the legalization of Islamic law in Indonesia, or as Muslims in a broader context), in-group members perceive the members of other Islamic movements as members of the same group. According to this, an approach to religious extremism that focuses solely on one dimension will miss the different ways in which the two groups marshal (eastward.g., socially) and are different (due east.g., politically), which in turn would fail to predict the group members' political alliances or conflict.

Applying the Model

To apply this model in more applied uses, we need to revisit the reason of this multidimensional model evolution. Unidimensional categorization of moderate vs. extremist lead to simplistic understandings whereby people with highly bourgeois beliefs in religion are associated with support for violence and terror. We propose that extremism is expressed along different dimensions and the mapping of groups and individuals using multiple dimensions in the model will help to understand the patterns of narratives and actions delivered by the groups. This allows for a more than nuanced understanding of religious violence whereby we acknowledge that violence can be motivated past different reasons (non necessarily related to political causes) and that the interplay between unlike dimensions on which extremism tin be expressed can either fuel or restrict religious violence (east.g., when a religious group is located at the extremist end of the political dimensions, just collectively shared theological beliefs forbid exercising violence).

Moving away from over-simplified representations of religious groups as politically motivated, the presented framework offers a practical method to empathize the multi-faceted nature of extremism. Information technology aims to analyze religion at both a group and individual level, augmenting scholarly understanding of the religious dimensions that may exist relevant to enable accurate predictions of tearing extremism based on ideological narratives (Kruglanski et al., 2018). Even though the four dimensions of religious extremism that we present here are informed by prior research on extremism and religiosity, the model that we developed is tailored to the context of Indonesian Muslims and their religious movements. When adopting this model in different or wider contexts (e.chiliad., Islamic movements in Pakistan or Egypt, or Christian groups in the Philippines or Northern Ireland), researchers need to think advisedly virtually the transferability of the model.

Practically speaking, when adopting the model in other contexts, researchers demand to engage in qualitative exploration of the dimensions religious groups utilise to limited their religiosity. For every dimension institute in a detail context, the researchers should then explore what the indicators are of extremism compared to moderate behavior. Rich descriptive information almost the context and specific intra- or intergroup processes need to exist considered to enable a multidimensional model tailored and adjusted to specific contexts. In this, some dimensions (e.g., ritual, political) may non apply to all contexts, while other new dimensions might need to exist added.

Such an exploration may well lead to the determination that the political dimension is the most important dimension to explicate violent behavior and that the other iii proposed dimensions (east.thou., theological, social, and ritual) are less relevant. Consider for instance the current extremism by Rakhine Buddhist in Myanmar against Rohingya Muslims. Trigger-happy actions confronting Rohingya Muslims in 2017 past Rakhine Buddhist were justified equally mere crackdowns against suspected Rohingya insurgents, suggesting that the political dimension may be most important to understand extremism in this context. Still, in other contexts, other dimensions appear to accept triggered violence. For instance, and besides in the context of Buddhist violence, the terrorist sarin assault in the Tokyo subway in 1995 by the cult group Aum Shinrikyo was non so much driven by extremism on the political dimension, but by extremism on the theological and/or ritual dimension. Specifically, the attack was motivated by a strong consensually shared conventionalities amid cult members that violence of this form would wash abroad their sins and this would allow them every bit a group to survive the imminent Armageddon.

What these examples also make articulate is that the content of the different dimensions and the fashion that moderate vs. extreme religiosity manifests itself differ for different religious groups. Specifically, while it is important to sympathise political violence amid Indonesian Muslims in terms of views on sharia laws, in the Myanmar context, political extremism centers on views against minorities and their rights. Or, while theological extremism in Indonesia is concerned with the view of God and ritual extremism relates to tolerance for deviating from generally accustomed normative ways of enacting religion, for Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, extremism on these dimensions is related to narratives and beliefs around Doomsday.

Finally, when applying the model in other contexts, it is important to consider new dimensions that may be important in understanding extremism. For case, Smart (1999) identifies seven dimensions of Buddhist religiosity, including novel dimensions such as the mythological and the experiential. Scholars would observe if these dimensions or others are relevant to differences betwixt moderates and extremists (for example, if Buddhist groups who are more than mystical are less likely to be extremist) through exploratory research and airplane pilot testing.

We, of course, support the prevention of violent extremism, but nosotros also back up the notion that being extreme in religious behavior is not always linked to back up for employing vehement tactics (Austin, 2018). Motivating people to participate in violent intergroup disharmonize, strong narratives about injustice and expected changes may exist involved (Moghaddam, 2005; Horgan, 2008). However, in many contexts (i.eastward., when the conflict involves religious groups), religious narratives tin fuel the willingness to join vehement movements on behalf of their group. By capturing how extremism is manifested across particular dimensions and how these dimensions predict support for violence, policy-makers can be more focused in countering the religious narratives that might be employed every bit the catalyst of violence and which are not relevant to address (or fifty-fifty counter-productive).

Implications

This paper highlights that religious extremism is not a unified and ubiquitous phenomenon; rather, religious extremists differ on a number of dimensions in how they express their organized religion, and consequently, how they aim to achieve important grouping goals. Using the context of Indonesian Muslim groups to explore these ideas, we propose that religiosity in Muslims can be moderate on one dimension and radical/farthermost on another. For instance, even though the Salafi motility has been generally identified as extremist (Haron and Hussin, 2013; Jones, 2014), to understand their extremism, we argue that it is important to exist both mindful of the group's extreme position when considering theological and ritual dimensions, just also their comparatively moderate stand politically. For example, even though Salafi movements in Indonesia perceive politics as morally corrupt (Chozin, 2013; Parveez, 2017), they nevertheless tend to avoid a political fence, and obey the rules of the existing authorities insofar as the government does not prohibit their religious rituals (Haron and Hussin, 2013; Parveez, 2017).

In a similar vein, the group Hizb al-tahrir is extreme in its stance on the political dimension, as it aims to revive the Islamic empire by overthrowing the concept of the nation state (e.m., Ward, 2009; Osman, 2010b). Nevertheless, their activists are moderate on the ritual dimension – they practise not criticize other Muslims for their "innovative" rituals (e.thou., celebration of the Prophet'due south birthday) – and they do not back up the use of physical violence in pursuing political demands (See: Ward, 2009; Schmid, 2013; Parveez, 2017). The group believes that jihad means a holy war, but not as the fashion to plant the Caliphate, just to conquer other nations later the Caliphate is established (Azman, 2015). In addition, this grouping was actively involved in protests to reject the cultures and norms of other groups in Republic of indonesia on behalf of Muslim as majority (e.g., rejecting the commemoration of Valentine's day). We might argue that Hizbut Tahrir is not just farthermost in its political dimension, but likewise theological and social dimensions. Nevertheless, this group seems to exist moderate in the ritual dimension.

Our purpose in this paper is to illustrate that different dimensions of religion are relevant to understanding religious extremism, and that the four dimensions discussed provide clarity in distinguishing a diversity of extreme vs. moderate presentations in the Indonesian Muslim context. Identifying religious extremism as multidimensional helps moving beyond labeling Muslims just as liberal, extreme, progressive, moderate, or radical. These labels fail to capture the diverse religious groups' similarities and differences beyond different dimensions, and wrongly cluster together religious actors with quite different historical pasts and hereafter trajectories. This "concept creep" (Haslam, 2016) or "jingle-jangle fallacy" (Van Petegem et al., 2013) prevents scholars from identifying the antecedents, character, and consequences of religious extremism in different aspects of life.

We invite scholars to consider extremism in relation to individual and grouping positions on theological, ritual, social, and political dimensions, and to expect a diversity of contestations within a faith that do non always co-vary. With this approach, it is important to be mindful of the fact that when researchers explore the relationship of religious extremism and other psychological processes, the type (dimension) of extremism needs to be considered. For example, every bit seen in the narratives of some extremist groups in Indonesia who highlight the "crisis of Islam" as a call to seek systemic alter, we predict that perceived injustice toward the religion past outsiders can enhance extremism on the political dimension, but may non affect extremism on the other dimensions every bit strongly. In this way, nosotros tin can accelerate knowledge of religious extremism, assuasive us to move toward a more consummate understanding of what is not only i phenomenon, but a constellation of related phenomena in an evolving, complex religious system of beliefs and acts embedded in broader historical and cultural change and stability.

Conclusion

Labeling groups or individuals as extremist is oft misleading. The label has a narrow pejorative significant which besides often associates extremism with terrorism (eastward.grand., the Bali bombings, or the Paris attacks). Failure to understand the complication of religious extremism risks stigmatizing some religious groups as irrational and supporting of violence when this is non the case. These negative stereotypes tin lead to separation, condition loss, and bigotry, too as wasted resources in mis-targeted counter-terrorism initiatives, and squandered political capital. Our hope is that a more comprehensive understanding of religious extremism will facilitate amend insight and nuanced dialogue. Understanding the multidimensionality of organized religion in the context of religious extremism will assistance in accurately depicting this phenomenon, and will facilitate understanding past scholars of the complex group processes associated with religious change, which have been neglected to date.

Writer Contributions

SW conceived of the presented idea. SW wrote the manuscript with support from WL and JJ. SW, WL, and JJ contributed to the final version of the manuscript, responding to reviewers' feedback.

Funding

SW received a PhD scholarship from the Indonesian Endowment for Educational Fund (PRJ-3449/LPDP.3/2016). The enquiry is likewise supported by an Australian Research Discovery grant (DP170101008) awarded to JJ.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that the inquiry was conducted in the absence of whatever commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of involvement.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Joshua Rhee, Zahra Mirnajafi, and Sam Popple for helpful editing suggestions on before versions of the manuscript.

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